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Philosophy, Law and Politics

Is the Mandatory Reporting of Convictions to Relevant Agencies Necessary for Fairness and Justice in Our Courts?

Adequate diligence and complete information are necessary for fair and sound decisions by judges, in both civil and criminal matters. Might States benefit from an enhanced requirement that criminal convictions of licensed professionals, for both lesser and more severe offenses, be reported to the State agency governing the defendant’s profession?

A measure before the New York State Legislature, Assembly (A11057-A) and Senate (S8909-A), would amend the New York education law to require reporting to the governing New York State Education Department the criminal convictions and determinations of professional misconduct of persons licensed by the Education Department. The District Attorney for each county within the State of New York would be required to report each conviction of a licensee to the Professional Conduct Officer of the Education Department. The licensee is similarly bound by an obligation of self-reporting. The licensee must self-report criminal convictions to the Education Department. The licensee is also required to report determinations of professional misconduct to the Education Department, regardless of jurisdiction.

A statutory system of fair reporting and due information provides those governed, such as those licensed by the New York Education Department, with both an incentive for proper professional conduct and a deterrence of nonprofessional conduct, before any ill deed is done. Professional codes provide learning within one’s professional disciple throughout one’s career, long after one’s formal academic training. And, a system of fair reporting insures that employers and the courts make fair, adequate and just determinations.

In founding the first American newspaper, Publick Occurrences, first sold in Boston on September 25, 1960, Benjamin Harris stated in his prospectus:

“That something may be done toward the Curing, or at least the Charming of that Spirit of Lying, which prevails amongst us, wherefore nothing shall be entered, but what we have reason to believe is true, repairing to the best fountains for our Information. And when there appears any material mistake in anything that is collected, it shall be corrected in the next. Moreover, the Publisher of these Occurrences is willing to engage, that whereas, there are many False Reports, maliciously made, and spread among us, if any well-minded person will be at the pains to trace any such false Report, so far as to find out and Convict the First Raiser of it, he will in this Paper (unless just Advice be given to the contrary) expose the Name of such Person, as A malicious Raiser of a false Report. It is suppos’d that none will dislike this Proposal, but such as intend to be guilty of so villainous a Crime.”

Neither the public nor the courts benefit from acting upon an absence of information. And, no one subject to a mandatory reporting requirement benefits if deprived of the rehabilitative purpose of ostensibly putative measures by inadequate information.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Do Young People Understand the Creation of the Law?

When looking at our three branches of government in America this electoral season, the role, place and stature of the executive, legislative and judicial branches should be well studied, Federal, State and Local. All citizens and residents, of all ages, should know the names of our governing officials from all three branches and their role in our community.

In guiding our young people, we need to go beyond a mention or two of the name of our Congressperson or the name of the Mayor or a member of our City Council. Children in this the second decade of our 21st century are truly knowledgeable of current events in the modern era, more so than ever in America’s history. They have seen the most recent national elections and campaigns. The know by first name Barack, Bernie, Bill, Colin, Condoleezza, Eric, George Sr., George W., Hillary, Loretta, Madeleine, and Mitt. They know that the current President is Donald and that the next might be Joe III.

Yet, we must share with them more than this. Especially, our young people need an acknowledgment and appreciation of the scholarship of the judiciary. Popular understanding of our judicial system and its stewards guarantees the freedom of thought of those who appear before them as well as of our nation. Judicial decision making in the public interest benefits from a knowledgeable public.

A truly fundamental common law subject as the creation of a contract may provide a basis for an objective discussion of how we learn from our Judges and so gain an equal understanding of the three branches of government in America. Contract law is of general interest, noncontroversial and permits discussion of the art of the judiciary.

An example is taken from a legal opinion written by Federal Magistrate Judge Michael Newman of the Southern District of Ohio. Judge Newman is the recent President of the Federal Bar Association. His term in private legal practice prior to the bench was as a law firm Partner in Cincinnati and was lengthy and well accomplished.

In Traton News LLC v. Traton Corp., No. 3:11-cv-435, 914 F. Supp. 2d 901, (S.D. Ohio 2012), Judge Newman expressly acknowledged that the case posed “an issue of first impression in [his] Court.” 914 F. Supp. 2d at 909. Namely, the question newly presented was whether a person using the Internet and who accesses a certain website, in doing so, agrees to the Terms and Conditions set forth in the website as specified by the Terms and Conditions. And, would this create a binding agreement that would support personal jurisdiction pursuant to the governing Terms and Conditions? Judge Newman found that this did not create a contract for want of consideration. In this instance, the Internet user accessing the website did not receive a benefit supporting the existence of a bilateral contractual obligation.

We must appreciate such judicial thought and show such appreciation with greater encouragement of participation in community and government discussion? Popular understanding that Judges impart wisdom when new questions arise is needed. Civil peace and understanding require that young people learn American government at a young age.

In Cincinnati, do young teenagers understand the theory of the judiciary and its role in fashioning our common law from our amorphous popular thinking? In theory, Judges turn custom into law, and in fashioning the law, they educate our customs. The scholars of William Blackstone argue that our customs may only become common law if their tenets conform to our sense of natural reason and justice. Do we teach this to our young people so that they may grow up to understand an increasingly more complex nation, with a far more applicable hierarchy of institutions of higher education in that all of us within the 50 states must defer to the established hierarchy of universities and colleges? The young in turn may guide their parents in an increased understanding of the modern world and a respect for the judiciary.

The American public must be taught to defer to the constitutional function of the judiciary: the administration of legal decision making as to residents, citizens and government. With the fragile delicacy of Marbury v. Madison in its creation of our doctrine of judicial review, all within our nation must respect the separate, equitable power of the American Judiciary as to the executive and legislative branches of government. Popular understanding of our popular self-interest, in a country whose government force and power are derived and ensured only as individuals understand our principles of government, will only be stronger.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Is a Failure to Prosecute Utterances of “Hate Speech” and “Fighting Words” a Violation of Due Process by Ohio County Prosecutors in Not Protecting the Victim’s Constitutional Rights of Liberty, Privacy and Personhood?

Under Ohio law, Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 regulates “hate speech” or “fighting words.” This statute expressly prescribes “offensively coarse utterance [and] gesture[,]” and “insulting [or] taunting [conduct] … likely to provoke a violent response.” § 2917.11(A)(2), (3). This law lies within criminal provisions of the Ohio Revised Code denominated “Disorderly Conduct,” as one of many “Offenses Against the Public Peace” of Chapter 2917. Has any duly elected Ohio County Prosecutor recently invoked this provision?

How does the community resident evaluate whether the absence of arrest and prosecution in his or her Ohio County is a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion in regulating conduct under Ohio law? In what other ways are the constitutionally protected, basic and fundamental rights of Ohio citizens and residents to privacy and personhood, as incumbent within our essential rights of liberty and freedom, protected from independent, idiosyncratic, and isolated acts of speech contrary to personal integrity?

Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 should be used by Ohio County Prosecutors to guide popular conduct, as a didactic tool. Section 2917.11 deters visceral, unkind speech directed, especially, to a person the potential perpetrator does not even know. And, importantly, this law looks to proscribe harmful words spoken when no logical rationale exists for devolving into such conduct when long historically permitted forms of expression and advocacy exist.

If traditional forms of expression, speech and participatory politics are possible, conduct subject to prosecution under Ohio Revised Code § 2917.17 only evokes either fear harmful to one’s sense of personhood or, more difficultly, fear expressed in the form of a harmful or violent response from the victim of the unkind speech. Do we instead prosecute the victim for engaging in an improper response to unprovoked hate speech and let the utterer of fighting words go free? Why is the fearful, dependent spouse convicted of homicide for shooting a long abusive, domineering spouse while asleep and unlikely to rise up in confrontation? When is self-defense illegal?

Is an Ohio County Prosecutor’s failure to prosecute hate speech and fighting words an unconstitutional disregard for the right of every individual to liberty, privacy and personal integrity, all long respected by the U.S. Supreme Court? Should the Ohio County Prosecutor, as a state actor, be subject to civil action, under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, for such a failure to prosecute? The right to Due Process includes one’s liberty interests, and the duty of the Ohio County Prosecutor to protect the liberty interests of Ohio citizens and residents subject to personally intrusive fighting words and hate speech by prosecuting those engaging in hateful speech. Does Section 1983 include a substantive due process right to challenge in Federal Court an Ohio County Prosecutor for the absence of prosecution of fighting words perpetrators under Ohio law?

The consequences arising from an Ohio County Prosecutor’s decision to not prosecute acts criminal under Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 are self-defining and derive inherently from the Anglo-American Common Law giving rise to the U.S. Constitution. A want of review, regulation and criminalization results in a perpetuation and acculturation of illegal intent and conduct within our country. American criminal law has many purposes, including, deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution and retribution. Laws exist on the “statute books” for a reason. These are the reasons for Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 .

How do we begin? How does the first individual abused as to self and personhood come forward in Federal Court and ask why his or her Ohio County Prosecutor did not seek redress on his or her behalf under expressly worded Ohio Law? Should such prosecution on the individual’s behalf be so permissive, and not a mandatory obligation of the duly ethical Ohio County Prosecutor under the professional rules and judicial decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court?

Life in our American Republic requires free speech and a sense of participation without fear and without improper inhibition. Justice and fairness in our democracy require that Ohio County Prosecutors act zealously, with best efforts and with a sense of being conservative to the utmost. Non action and a failure to prosecute potential perpetrators under enacted legislation is not conservative, it is the opposite. Prosecutorial discretion is both permissive and mandatory. Where do our State and Federal Courts draw the line?

In a democracy, free speech is a property right. It is not to only be accorded governmental protection as a permissive privilege. In America, a citizen or resident should not feel as if he or she must ask permission of an equal to speak or live, for fear of becoming a victim of hostile words. He or she should freely speak. If the equal is inhibiting in a manner contrary to § 2917.11, the Ohio County Prosecutor should act.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

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Law Students Before the Judiciary, Revisited

On Christmas Eve, last, I asked if the Rules formally adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court to govern the Ohio Bar might be amended to improve the educational opportunities of Ohio’s law students prior to their graduation. Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, R. II., “Limited Practice of Law by a Legal Intern.” Perhaps, all Ohio law students should be permitted to share in providing formal legal representation to clients when mentored by a supervising attorney. This is something Cincinnati’s current Mayor John Cranley did as a student at Harvard Law School. He participated in a student practitioner program in the Massachusetts court system as a member of the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, as I had done myself many years before. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts permits Second Year law students to engage in supervised civil representation, and Third Year law students to engage in both supervised civil and criminal representation. S.J.C. Rule 303.

Currently, when mentored by an Ohio attorney, the Ohio Supreme Court permits Ohio law students to act as student practitioner legal interns in both civil and criminal matters, and before courts, administrative boards and government agencies. Gov. Bar R. II. Sec. 5. Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court only permits law student practitioners to do so in their Third Year of law school. Gov. Bar R. II. Sec. 2.

Support truly exists for permitting Ohio law students to begin student legal internships in their Second, or even First, Year of law school. Ohio’s law students are usually employed part time while full time law students, as law clerks in law firms, corporations, governmental agencies, as well as in the offices of State and Federal partisan elected officials. Student practitioner duties would not diminish attention given legal studies.

Paid part time legal employment supplements participation in law school Moot Court and Clinical programs. Many students engage in law related employment before entering law school. Both the practice customs and economic structure of Ohio’s legal community would encourage the Ohio Supreme Court to expand upon its own court rules, and those of other States, to permit student practitioners to provide formal legal representation to clients. Currently, Ohio’s Third Year law students may only represent the financially needy and governmental entities, though in both civil and criminal matters. Gov. Bar R. II. Sec. 5.

If the clear majority of Ohio law students currently work in a for profit or personally interested capacity during law school, for law firms, corporations and partisan elected officials, why would an ethical concern arise if their current for profit or personally interested client work product were accorded the formal sanctioning of Rule II legal intern status? The for profit or partisan attorneys by whom they are currently employed are subject to the same professional ethical duties as are the government and public interest attorneys presently sanctioned by Rule II. The due and proper incentive of government should enable students to derive the most from the structure, both formal and informal, of their academic environment during their tenure as students.

We should agree that if law students maintain employment begun before enrollment through their First Year, law school studies would not suffer if they were given Rule II student practitioner privileges for this, or similar, work during First Year. Rather, our theories of client interest and adversarial practice, as the guiding principles of our judicial system, indicate that formal legal representation during law school enhances understanding of both law school studies and substantive for profit work product.

Acknowledgement by the Ohio Supreme Court of the substantive, for profit legal work currently incumbent upon law students in the private sector would enhance the depth of their legal study, and they would then more greatly succeed upon graduation into private practice. In for profit law clerk employment, law students research and draft, with the obligatory duty incumbent upon a practitioner, as do the current Rule II law students with governmental and public interest entities. The formal right to appear in a representative capacity, in deference to a mentoring attorney, allows a law student to fully understand the burden of client representation regardless of the economic status of the client.

Law students rely upon law school course work and law clerk employment to develop required skills in legal methods, specifically, analyzing judicial opinions, conducting Federal and State legislative histories, and the comparative analysis of both primary and secondary legal sources. With the addition of formal practice during First and or Second Year, Ohio law students would make a more informed choice of practice areas, and more readily begin their practice after graduation. Even our best known legal practitioners in Ohio, and we need not name names, would, I am sure, concede that, as graduates of Ohio law schools, they would have truly benefited from such an Hohfeldian right and privilege.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls