In July of 2025, the U.S. Congress enacted a law titled: “Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act” (commonly referred to as “the GENIUS Act”). This law would permit the issuance of a form of digital asset known as a “payment stablecoin” that would be used only for purposes of payment or settlement and not investment. Among various entities, payment stablecoins maybe issued by depository institutions but are not federally insured. Rather, they are supported by the requirement that every payment stablecoin issuer maintain a reserve fund of equal value to its outstanding payment stablecoins in U.S. dollars or items of a similar form.
In the course of implementing the GENIUS Act, the U.S. Department of the Treasury requested comments from the general public with respect to future regulation. The memorandum below was submitted in response.
From: Lori G. Nuckolls, Public Policy Researcher and Writer, Philosophy, Law and Politics (lorigaylenuckolls.blog)
To: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Attention: Office of the General Counsel, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20220, Via Electronic Submission: https://www.regulations.gov
Re: GENIUS Act Implementation Comments, TREAS-DO-2025-0037, 90 Fed. Reg. 45159-45163 (Sept. 19, 2025), 90 Fed. Reg. 47251 (Oct. 1, 2025) (Submission date extension)
Date: November 1, 2025
I. Introduction
The GENIUS Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5916 (2025), was enacted with the legislative purpose of providing legal guidance and regulation in the use of stablecoins as a digital asset. A statutorily created “payment stablecoin,” denominated in U.S. Dollars, would be issued by legally approved entities and would allow entrance into the digital marketplace in a safe and sound manner. 90 Fed. Reg. 45159 (Sept. 19, 2025). In regulating the issuance of payment stablecoins by subsidiaries of depository institutions, specifically nonprofit depository institutions such as credit unions, the U.S. Department of the Treasury should consider regulations that support and permit as well require the nonprofit organizations to honor their asserted charitable mission and purpose. With respect to the credit union, this would be pursuance of its historical mission and purpose of enabling its governing members to obtain access to historically unavailable financial services, develop financial literacy, and transition into a competitive socio-economic environment premised upon self-government and self-sustainability. Credit unions which have already successfully entered the heretofore unregulated digital asset marketplace offer extensive and direct training to leaders, staff, and members to avoid financial loss. Participation of credit unions, large and small, in a well-regulated digital asset marketplace would facilitate the long-sought self-government and financial growth of members.
The Department of the Treasury should consider that nonprofit financial institutions bear a higher ethical standard than do for-profit entities. Their existence depends upon their reputation within the communities they serve and the absence of their engaging in intense competition with their peers. Credit unions rely upon the trust they engender in society, not to mention donors, volunteers and members. In governing the payment stablecoin activities of all nonprofits, including credit unions, regulators should premise requirements upon the principle that the trust engendered by the conduct of the nonprofit organization is based upon not only the appearance of propriety but also upon the absence of even the appearance of impropriety.
As a consequence, regulation could guide nonprofit organizations in achieving balance between engaging in authorized emerging digital assets and guaranteeing the financial stability of the communities served. Whereas, unleashing digital assets in a scarcely regulated environment to enable the efficiency, directness and globalization emerging digital technologies provide, would be an example of dialectical creative destruction. And, this achievement of positive development while permitting a threshold level of hardship is to be mitigated in the regulatory process. Specifically, in the historically financially fragile communities of the credit union, little is achieved by regulation allowing entrance into the digital asset marketplace if the burden of greater risk is endured by the financial communities most in need. Thus, questions arise as to how regulation of the nonprofit organization is to be structured in theory and practice.
II. Credit Union Subsidiary Issuers of Payment Stablecoins: a Theory of Regulation to Avoid the Creative Destruction Dialectic
The GENIUS Act currently provides that all issuers of payment stablecoins, state and federal, are required to meet federal standards. 12 U.S.C. § 5903(c) (2025). In regulating nonprofit organizations and, guiding regulation by the National Credit Union Administration of credit unions and the distinct communities they serve, perhaps the Department of the Treasury could consider the theoretical doctrine of the “veil of ignorance” established by American philosopher John Rawls. In the veil of ignorance, Rawls suggests that society place itself in the “original position” in which each individual in society envisions oneself to not know one’s specific place in society. (Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)).
In this case, the principles of the veil of ignorance guide governing leaders and citizens in reaching agreement as to public policy, law and regulation. Choices in law would be determined by a general understanding as to what being a citizen should mean. Commonality of thought would arise from leaders and the public alike perceiving themselves guided by the veil of ignorance under which they reach decisions and enact laws without consideration of their own personal circumstance and condition. Rather, each person deems their position to be that of those most vulnerable and in need. And, in turn, they seek a legal structure most capable of providing a just and fair society.
Specifically, the Department of the Treasury would identify with credit union staff and members most benefiting from the financial services and training provided and least familiar with emerging digital asset technologies. Safe harbor regulations for credit unions and other nonprofit organizations would guide the ambitious and encourage the wary ones unfamiliar with the digital asset marketplace. For, both are truly outnumbered by for-profit entities. In doing so, credit union regulation, in particular, would allow financial growth through the creative use of digital assets while maintaining a safety net for the credit union governed by members most in need of financial literacy and growth.
The GENIUS Act and its framework for the issuance of payment stablecoins as a creature of statute is a blank slate. It enables the beginning of a new economy premised upon regulation in the John Rawls original position, derived from the veil of ignorance. For example, both regulators and credit unions, including their issuer subsidiaries, would envision themselves in the position of a credit union with truly dependent members situated in a community of similar prospective members increasing in number. To continue in existence, this credit union and its members must be knowledgeable of market development, namely the advent of digital assets. In this position, Treasury would govern with reference to legal standards that would enable an understanding of rights, powers, and privileges, as well as the risks they engender. From this new beginning, credit unions would be able to implement risk assessment policies allowing the balancing of legally authorized conduct against the forbearance of some legally permitted activity in order to maintain trust and goodwill within the community. For, credit unions might not need to be as ambitious and as competitive as the GENIUS Act possibly allows.
III. Conclusion
With the GENIUS Act as a beginning, Congress and the administrative agencies may readily provide financial regulation of all nonprofit organizations as they enter every aspect of the digital asset marketplace. In guiding this transition, the law should promote new strategies of growth and risk management as to digital assets as it has historically with respect to more traditional financial markets.