Philosophy, Law and Politics

Law Is Our Only Legally Required Social Didactic

Do we only garner community support and respect when we firmly plant our feet in the soil, or, in our concrete of modern times, and discuss our world from top to bottom. Those concerns of science are most significant and are necessary to our daily, quotidian existence. They are on top and are accorded a greater priority than those related to aesthetics and art. We respect our civilized lives, culture and government, as our governments have arisen from more, primitive versions of written governing documents: federal, state and local. We defend the rights and privileges our democratic republic grants and pledges to ensure to citizens and, in some cases, residents not yet citizens.

Every citizen, and those not yet citizens, in America, possess details that give rise to abstractions as attributes of personhood. Our American soil and modern concrete imparts into our indicia of personhood, and synergizes within our American populace and guests, a refinement of our civilization.

Americans will refine society until achieving natural extinction of our planet. America’s continuing writing of its history, and the contributions of its history makers, will share within the pages. In learning how to make and share history, we must explain the puzzles as we solve them. We mature within the course of both our history and our future, and the varied social institutions. More importantly, we must explain our popular lawmaking, both within the formal, authorized bodies of government, as well as lawmaking through the informal popular influence of citizens and residents.

Each law in America is an historical fact, from our legislatures as statute, and as common law and law at equity from state and federal judiciaries. (See, Maine, Henry Sumner. Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Chap. IX.) As the history and nation grows and refines, commerce advances, and our world increasingly becomes more complex as do the contracts governing transactions. Legislatures enact and reform statutes. Governmental agencies study and regulate specialized subject maters. Our courts define words, review state action and rule upon issues of law and fact.

The communities we live in grow to more and more contain aesthetics, literary attributes, sciences, and technologies. Our laws increase to permit our use, and our continued revision of our laws permit their continued use. Most of our new laws arise from contracts between two or more parties. Contracts impart principles of fair and honest dealing, which Judges — elected and appointed — review and interpret, with justice and fairness to the parties, the legal community and society. The contracts increase in complexity and sophistication.

Generationally, each of us, as did our predecessors and as will our future descendants, gleans a sense of self. This sense of individual, personal morality exists distinct from our popular majority’s collective value system we voluntarily self-impose. (See, Twain, Mark. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Chap. I.) All the laws of the community, as well as the values embodied within us, create a sacredness we and government respect. (See, Maine, Henry Sumner. Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Chap. IX.)

In the words of my father, Charles Butler Nuckolls, Jr., a retired history teacher: “patriotism is a love of country not for what it is, but for what it is able to become.” Our personal and collective morality, and the laws arising from them, are to be revised and remedied if we are to be properly accorded respect thereunder.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Philosophy, Law and Politics

Greenspace and Culture for All!

The Cincinnati park of Burnet Woods is a wonderful asset of the Cincinnati community, and has been so since first begun in 1872. And, our community is obligated to both maintain and transition this park into a modern greenspace. Cincinnatians and learned science professionals, together, should discuss and decide the proper changes to Burnet Woods and Cincinnati’s greenspaces, generally. The current proposal for two community center buildings in Burnet Woods brings to popular discussion an issue not yet mentioned that is less related to concerns of environmental preservation. Specifically, the proposal to place a building within Burnet Woods that would essentially serve the current purposes of the Clifton Cultural Arts Center asks questions about equal planning for our various neighborhoods in Cincinnati.

Currently, the Clifton center provides cultural events and educational resources to those beyond the neighborhood of Clifton. Many young and old within Cincinnati would like to continue to rely upon the center. And, its location in Burnet Woods would have to be generally accessible by car and school bus. For, it is unlikely that it would be as currently within reach of those visiting by foot from nearby. But, more importantly, the center would place on public land a resource generally needed, yet unavailable, in most neighborhoods. The Clifton center arose from the needs and requests of one Cincinnati neighborhood. And, it has ably done so. Yet, a similar cultural resource has been long discussed and requested by many neighborhoods similarly in need, including the neighborhood of Ohio Representative Alicia Reece, namely Bond Hill.

Most neighborhoods would not be provided for by the arts center proposed for Burnet Woods. Before the Burnet Woods center is approved, we have an obligation to discuss providing access to cultural arts equally within the city. It is unlikely and unwise that each neighborhood community requesting such a center could request a similar grant of land to do so by the Cincinnati Park Board. The Burnet Woods proposal is not properly precedent, or ratio decidendi.

The discussion of providing beyond the neighborhood recreation centers is a difficult one, and neighborhoods such as Bond Hill have long puzzled the question of transitioning an aged commercial business district for modern use. A small cultural center was proposed for an area near the intersection of Reading Road and California Avenue. It would have been similar to the current centers in Kennedy Heights and Pleasant Ridge. Perhaps it, alone, would not have completely sufficed. Yet when does capitalism not permit trial and error of not-for-profit ventures as for our for-profit, start-up entrepreneurial ones. Essentially, the Burnet Woods center only initiates review and discussion obligatorily within the purview of our discussion of fair and equal neighborhood planning.

For our neighborhoods stymied as to a beginning, even a small urban gardening space, such as one upon a space near the proposed cultural center in Bond Hill, would begin discussion with a venture not requiring a permanent decision or commitment, and which, even if only short term, would ameliorate an available space.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Philosophy, Law and Politics

To Legalize, Or, Not To Legalize?

In discussing the current debate of whether the use and sale of marijuana should be generally allowed in each of the 50 States, and no longer be deemed a criminal activity, requires that thought be given to American history and traditional theories of the law. And, perhaps our debate should focus on the history of Prohibition, last century.

Currently proposed legislation before the U.S. Congress asks if the Federal government may, or should, dictate that the use of marijuana is legal conduct for every citizen in every state. Or, should the Federal Government respect the aged-old American doctrine of States Rights and the prudent theory of experimentation within and among jurisdictions, whether they be the Federal judicial Appellate Circuits, the States themselves, or the various political subdivisions therewithin?

As citizens, we must ask in what manner marijuana differs from the time honored American custom of enjoying fermented and distilled spirits – alcohol. If marijuana is properly legal in the United States, regardless of locale, for social, and not only medical, purposes, what is the scientific rationale for permitting it being criminalized in any jurisdiction within the country? If legal in any State and deemed safe by our scientific community, is there a valid legal rationale for treating the use of marijuana differently from the current regulation of our use of alcohol?

Traditional grassroots, self-governance of communities in America is the foundation of our democracy, our representative republic. Governing jurisdictions, as small as towns and villages, may dictate legal policy as to the sale and use of alcohol within their jurisdictions. Yet, they may not proscribe the use of alcohol. This has only been done and repealed by a revision of the U.S. Constitution. Marijuana, like alcohol, should properly be regulated below the Federal level by State and Local Governments only as they regulate commerce within their boundaries. Like alcohol, marijuana requires more regulation than English muffins and wheat bread. Such regulation, though, results from theories of corporate and business structure, and the proper purposes of land use management – zoning restrictions.

If legal in one State, marijuana should be legal in all. And, the existence of the 50 States, and our various political subdivisions and territories, permits American capitalism to experiment. Various business forms may evolve from the art of the “dry county,” the State owned and or regulated, stand alone “brick and mortar” business concern, or the State regulated, corner shop in the interstate or international grocery store.

And, there cannot be an argument for not fully expunging the criminal records of conviction and time served for offenders penalized for personal expression before their governing officials “saw the light.” It goes without saying, then, that, too, all criminal defendants currently “serving time” for marijuana only offenses should be released through existing transitional, reentry programs. Not doing so would be merely a creative theory of law ex post facto.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Philosophy, Law and Politics

Clarity and Equality in the Ohio Sales Tax Statute?

The following Comment Letter was submitted today to the Ohio General Assembly Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review for consideration during its review of a proposed amendment of an Ohio Sales Tax regulation regarding interstate commerce.

May 10, 2018

Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review

The Ohio General Assembly

Vern Riffe Center

77 South High Street

Concourse Level

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Sent Via Email to: jcarr1@jcarr.state.oh.us

Re: Department of Taxation Proposed Amendment of Rule Number 5703-9-39 (Interstate commerce)

Dear Members of the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review,

I write with interest in the proposed amendment of Rule Number 5703-9-39 of the Ohio Administrative Code by the Department of Taxation regarding the imposition of a tax upon retail sale transactions between Ohio residents and out-of-state vendors. The Rule Summary and Fiscal Analysis submitted by the Department of Taxation to accompany this proposed amendment states that the Department seeks merely to make grammatical corrections in the Rule and not adopt any substantive changes.

The proposed amendment does not adequately revise the text of the Rule to correct certain wording that is confusing to citizens and residents of the various States who would engage in commerce, as well as those engaging in commerce abroad. For, it does not clearly indicate that purchases are exempt from taxation if delivered via an interstate carrier to either the buyer or the agent of the buyer and, instead, gives the sense that the exemption applies only to interstate carrier deliveries made to an agent.

Similarly, the proposed amendment retains reference to “an agent of his” in acknowledgement that Ohio purchasers of goods from foreign vendors may avail themselves of an agent to receive the goods purchased. Legal drafters in the 21^st century style to no longer use personal pronouns reflective of gender when the concept of gender is not materially relevant to the import and substance of the law.

Finally, the Rule would also lessen confusion if it did not refer to the sales tax as a “retail sales tax” unless such is done consistently throughout Ohio Revised Code Chapter 5703: Sales Tax and Ohio Administrative Code Chapter 5703-9: Sales and Use Tax. For, the sales tax is more often referred to as an “excise tax,” and O.R.C. §5739.02, in implementing the sales tax, expressly states that “an excise tax is hereby levied on each retail sale made in this State.”

In respect of the foregoing, I offer the following modification of the amendment, with proposed changes italicized:

5703-9-39 Interstate commerce.

When tangible personal property is sold within the State and the vendor is obligated to deliver it to a point outside of the State, or to deliver it to a carrier or to the mails for transportation to a point outside of the State, the Ohio Sales sales Tax tax does not apply. However, where tangible personal property pursuant to a sale is delivered in this State to either the buyer or to an its agent, of his other than an interstate carrier the retail Sales Tax sales tax applies, unless the delivery is made by means of an interstate carrier, notwithstanding that the buyer may subsequently transport the property out of the State.

The grant of a sales tax exemption for purchases made by Ohioans from out-of-state vendors whom, themselves, have no physical presence within Ohio or nexus with Ohio, is a great encouragement to the advance of commerce. It provides economic efficiency to domestic purchasers and encourages reciprocity in the tax policy of other States.

I thank you greatly for considering my comments on this Rule. And, I may certainly be contacted as indicated above.

Sincerely,

Lori G. Nuckolls

Philosophy, Law and Politics

Promoting Reasonable and Consistent State Agency Regulation in Ohio

Proposed new regulations of Ohio Executive Agencies are reviewed for adequacy by the Ohio Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review, composed of members of the Ohio Senate and House. In the current proposed revision of Ohio law governing the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review (SB 221, amending Ohio Revised Code 106.021), perhaps it should be made mandatory that JCARR undertake review of whether a proposed regulation is contrary to law and similarly be required to request an invalidation of a proposed rule by the Ohio General Assembly upon making a finding that a proposed regulation is contrary to law. Under current law, both are left to JCARR’s discretion.

Mandatory review and invalidation is necessary because JCARR should be precluded from permitting unreasonable proposed rules and regulations to become effective. A regulation must be reasonable to be lawful. Agencies should adequately justify their decision making with sufficient analysis and explanation. It is the duty of JCARR to ensure as a balance and check on government that the agencies make wise and reasoned policy choices. JCARR does not supplant its policy choices for that of the agency, rather it only looks to the due and proper procedure and basis upon which the agency relies for the rule its seeks to promulgate. Such a requirement of reasonableness would result in regulation that is consistent with and does not conflict with governing law, without first relying upon a court for judicial review after the harm has been done. No committee of a state legislature should have within its discretion non-action upon arbitrary and capricious proposed agency regulation.

A review of the possible “adverse impact” of a proposed regulation is a preexisting requirement as to Ohio Revised Code 106.021(F). Usually neither an analysis nor finding of a possible adverse impact is reported for consideration as to the validity of a proposed regulation. Review of potential adverse impact usually merely addresses fiscal, business considerations, and not the substantive analysis required in legal drafting.

SB 221, Line 103, amending Ohio Revised Code 101.352, proposes to permit JCARR to seek an agency’s appearance to explain whether current rules reflect the principles and policies of the agency, or rather whether the agency should propose new rules that establish its present basis for regulation. Yet, this duty is permissive and subject to JCARR’s discretion and is not mandatory, even if JCARR is on notice that an agency’s regulations are not up to date? Would a mandatory provision place too great an administrative burden upon JCARR?

SB 221, Line 134, amending Ohio Revised Code 101.352, similarly permits that upon initiating review of an agency’s regulations and receiving an agency’s testimony at a hearing, JCARR “may” but is not required to vote upon whether to recommend that the agency review its regulations. Would making the vote mandatory create a violation of the separation of powers among the legislative, judicial and executive branches? Or, would it no more enhance the power and authority currently permitted JCARR than the creation of its power to review proposed executive agency regulations in the first instance?

SB221, Lines 1541-1619, amending Ohio Revised Code 121.931, permits a person to petition an agency to request a review of whether the agency has not properly revised or restated its regulations. If the agency denies the petition, the petitioner may appear at an agency hearing. In such a proceeding, how is the agency’s standard of review – that the petitioner has shown that the agency’s action in not revising its regulation is “erroneous” – to be defined? Is the burden of proof borne by the petitioner – that the agency’s previously stated “intention to deny the petition [for revision] is erroneous” — the same as a required showing of erroneousness by the petitioner as to the agency’s rationale for not granting the petition and undertaking a revision or restatement of the rule? Does an inquiry as to whether the agency’s action is erroneous go only to questions of fact or also to whether the agency may have committed an error of law? Is a finding of erroneousness too high a standard for the petitioner to bear? Given that a petitioner may not appeal a denial of a petition within the agency, is an agency denial of a petition a final agency action permitting judicial review?