Science and the Right to Abortion

Judicial review in the United States serves a fundamental purpose in American government, it permits the courts to ensure that the acts of the other two branches of government, the legislative and executive, abide the Constitution. In doing so it enables the sovereign citizenry to create a legitimate representative government. As American society develops it changes its views of the nation and the world and, as a result, the laws by which it lives. Over time, the views of its judges as seen in their legal opinions also change.

One must remark that political opinions in the United States have been modified extensively to the extent that the public has completely changed its mind on many important life defining issues. As a result, certain laws and legal opinions contradict preexisting ones. For example, the legality of racial segregation became the right to racial, integration. The illegality of contraception became the right to birth control. The illegality of racial miscegenation became the right to interracial marriage. The illegality of abortion became a legal right to private abortion. The illegality of sodomy became the right to homosexual relationships. The illegality of homosexual marriage became the right to same-sex marriage.These changes in American law occur concurrently with noteworthy developments in social customs, science and technology that render the population able to envision present society in a new manner. Some regard these legal developments as not occurring with sufficiency to be adequate or just.

With respect to the legal recognition of a right to abortion by the judiciary in 1973, many social and scientific developments have taken place prompting judicial restrictions upon this right in 2022. In example, in vitro fertilization is a very common practice. As a result, issues before society are when a right to life begins and whether one’s power to create this life is accompanied by a power to destroy it. Contemporary opinions also include those arising from whether there is a governmental power of capital punishment or a private right to assisted suicide for the terminally ill.

American society must address the legal question of what constitutes life and what are its attributes. Could the concept of in vitro fertilization include a right to property? In discussing abortion, America must reconcile its power to begin and end life with newfound scientific developments.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

Natural Aristocracy In A Time Of Digital Technology

Transitions in history often occur when scientific and technological development create social change. Our 21^st century of the postmodern era portends such social change. The digital technology before us and continually advancing, whether it be mobile phones, social media, websites, virtual reality, cryptocurrency, artificial intelligence, or the myriad not mentioned and not yet invented, are a social conundrum. In implementing this new technology, a safeguard is required to provide government by society’s intellectual elite.

The objective of every democratic republic is a society of individuals treated equally by governing law. Equality is not economic; it is in the right to participate equally and to be accorded due and just reward for one’s ability. In the wisdom of a British philosopher and politician of old, Edmund Burke, this was, and should ideally be, government by a natural aristocracy. It arises from the population of the republic, from the citizens academically cultivated who defer their social doctrines and privileges to those of their country.

The American democratic republic, as well as those around the globe, rely upon an effective self-governing citizenry. This citizenry arises from a society of individuals whose ability to self-govern is cultivated from their early years. Self-government and participation in society depend upon academic institutions and cultural attributes that are both inclusive of all and supported by a national government that is derived from the country’s natural aristocracy.

Today, we look to our social melting pot, as popularized in the theater of the early 1900s. We use our governing democratic institutions to cultivate children into adults, both as citizens and immigrants, to place the role individual in society first and foremost before all other affiliations. Each individual must learn to self-govern and participate in the various strata of society and the governing institutions as a self-governing individual. Cultural and social duties and privileges are subordinate to the obligatory patriotic devotion to one’s country cultivated in children and adults.

In enjoying the advancements of our increasingly more computerized society, we should ensure that social and governmental advancements parallel all scientific and technological advancements. We must guarantee that no harm results. In benefiting from new technology, we need not experience the historical dialectic of: advancement – destruction – development.

Democratic republics are not founded upon tyranny, irregardless of whether an autocrat or the public majority. The invention and application of digital technology must be accompanied by education for all and government by the republic’s best and brightest representing the people. Only when a natural aristocracy governs is a democracy a country of equals.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

Ohio Constitutional Amendments Demand a 50% Voter Approval: Vote No on Issue 1

On Tuesday, August 8^th, vote no. For, a majority, 50%, approval by the voters of amendments to the Ohio Constitution should be maintained. America is a country governed by its people, one of majority rule.

We, through the U.S. Constitution and those of the states, acknowledge that a majority of a population of a country might be flawed and tyrannous. Consequently, America engages in a representative system of “checks and balances.” Our legislative bodies, executives and courts act to filter our laws and reforms. In no respect does America act under a system of direct democracy wherein the collective body of individuals determines the laws by which they are governed. With respect to the amendment of the Ohio Constitution, amendment proposals require extensive review by the Attorney General, Ballot Board or Secretary of State. All proposed amendments may be challenged in a case brought before the Ohio Supreme Court.

With these checks and balances in place, we should encourage popular involvement and participation in American government, not place our legal development more and more out of reach. The Ohio Constitution is rarely amended. It is a truly difficult process, even by the majority vote of the electorate. The current constitutional requirement inspires communities and learning so that a voter may form opinions and express oneself at the polls. A sense of self and self-government are needed in light of rapidly developing technologies, such as artificial intelligence and digital assets. We should not dilute or remove the people from the process of law.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

The Democracy and Science Equilibrium

(Originally published in Thinktank No. 45 (British Mensa Ltd., Wolverhampton, West Midlands, Eng., U.K.), Winter 2021, at 2-4.)

Science and technology could enable us to develop democracy and the common good as they evolve in complexity and achieve a greater standard of living. The history of our world arrives from progressive steps of scientific advancements and governmental policy reform that leapfrog and alternate one after another. The difference between these points has at times been extreme, such as, in the modern era, the destructive technology at Hiroshima followed by the humane and peaceful mitigating governmental reform and salvo of the United Nations.

Humans are lost in contradictions between scientific advancements and humane policy initiatives, awaiting the synthesis of the dialectic, fearing that the contradictions will perpetuate through history. A scientific view of the history of culture influences our interpretation and application of technology. In providing enhancements in materialism, technology should defer to democratic principles. Governmental policy and reform must measure and evaluate technological power in a manner that honors foremost the public and common good.

Human nature is both good and bad. The minds of men give rise to negative incidents. Freedom, justice, equity and other positive connotations of progress require a global democracy founded upon diplomacy and immigration. Society must ensure that science and technology do not overwhelm, transcend or overpower a global democratic government.

Neither chance nor happenstance determine scientific and technological developments apart from study and expertise. Humans are self-determining. Democracies are founded upon meritocratic competition and government by a natural aristocracy ruling over a majority of equals. We must develop a global future without repeating mistakes of the past and without allowing scientific and technological developments create mistakes of the future. Moral principles must govern our technological advancements. We must look beyond the public good, the good produced for the majority population, being in utilitarian thought the greatest good for the greatest number. We must look for the common good of all.

An increasingly higher standard of materialism produced by technological advancements achieves, or at least could achieve, a public good for the world over.

In looking to the future in view of the past, the public good must be coextensive with the common good and principles of individual and personal dignity. A global, meritocratic democracy is one of fairness and equality, a utopia of self-government and community participation. A utopia which may be within reach.

A global democracy requires global respect for individual humanity and a shared appreciation for different identities, whether they be cultural, racial, religious, ethnic, national, gender and or sexual orientation, etc. And, this requires a quest for the common good where governing institutions maintain a quality of living for all citizens.

The present global dissension should not allow individual identities transcend our fidelity to a global citizenship and equality under the rule of international law, the common good. Immigration of those in search of a free country is the basis of the American democratic experiment as well as many others.

Worldwide, individuals will always possess unique group identities that separate them. In as early as the beginning 1900s, global migration in behest of freedom, unity and justice was the source of discussion in international entertainment. As stated in The Melting Pot, written by British playwright Israel Zangwill, premiered to rave reviews by American President Theodore Roosevelt in Washington, D.C. in 1908, and then in London in 1909, individuals can amalgamate into a melting pot of citizens who maintain and express their pluralistic selves.

Within a New Melting Pot of the twenty-first century, each citizen would respect the culture of all. Modern democracy would provide that all cultures are neither preempted by government nor society so long as the cultures are respectful of each other and of democracy. Former colonial nations exist that are still fraught with violent, anarchical and technologically steeped governments. Powerful democracies should strive to bring about a global democracy based upon the commonality of human nature.

In a New Melting Pot, we should seek a new utopian social contract of a just society under a global democratic government by imagining that we, ourselves, do not know our respective future condition, our position in society, or our own self-interest. We then, in all countries, would seek laws and governing institutions that safeguard the position of the least well-off in society as that becomes our point of self-interest. For, social unrest occurs when a social contract is disregarded, and there appears to be no other means of effective popular expression.

The conquering of Afghanistan by the Taliban is a recent example. Once students of religion, the Taliban now strive for a brokering by foreign powers of an inclusive government. Yet to be seen is whether the Taliban social contract will be one solely of religious doctrine. Or whether, instead, the insurgence resulted because only their faith provided a source of belief and trust rather than the democracy they now seek.

Another example is the continuing abduction of African school children. Attacks upon children’s schools are attacks upon the basis of democracy: education. Such acts are by those feeling deeply uncared for in society, evoke attention and result in government for none.

Neither we nor our leaders should allow our pluralistic identities determine our decisions and opinions. Rather, in a democratic society we should participate in our political community and do so in a way that places the principles governing a republic above all else. The doctrines incumbent within our group identities must defer to these founding principles.

The continuum of political affiliations, from left to right, may freely express opinions in civil discussion and debate, the requirements of a democratic society. Democratic self-government and participation should be cultivated. Public participation should be facilitated by reasonable means. Many citizens do not know how to vote. Many nondemocratic countries lack knowledge in how a democracy could be constructed from their existing society and government.

The New Melting Pot requires public and private leaders who guide citizens in their ability to place a global citizenship above personal identities and who engage in policies and decisions that reflect the myriad of identities in society. The decision making of our private and public leadership should consider public opinion regarding life’s issues and concerns gleaned from civil and respectful public expression, encouraged and not ignored.

Diplomacy may be the only answer. We exist interdependently and no one is entirely responsible for a success or failure, a win or loss. A meritocratically governed democracy is to be respected by all.

Perhaps our first step toward globalization in the leapfrog dialectic is that of respect for one another. Respect in behest of life creates goodwill rather than destruction. And, it is difficult to assert destructive technology and governmental power against life one respects. An earnest understanding of one another is the foundation of the global public and common good and a source of integrity and dignity for all.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

On Voting, What Did The Founders Say?

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist Paper No. 59, acknowledged in Article I, Section IV of the U.S. Constitution that the authority to determine the times, places and manner of elections resided with the state legislatures, yet Congress also possessed the power to alter state election law. According to Hamilton, this ultimate authority over state election law could be exercised by the federal government “whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety.” The reason for placing the initial power in the states was not the traditional rational of promoting valid experimentation to encourage developments in both state and federal law. Rather, as noted by constitutional law scholar Joseph Story in 1833 in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, there was a concern that Congress, or a few Congresspersons from dominant states, might use the ultimate power of the federal government to enact unreasonable federal election laws favoring certain persons.

According to Hamilton and Story, the theory underlying the division of power is the necessity that every government possess its own mode of preservation. State and local governments are diverse, diffuse and can result in experimental, regulatable and accountable methods of election. However, Article I, Section IV of the U.S. Constitution expressly grants the power of preservation of the Union to the federal government. Story called this a “superintending power” over state election law.

We must ask if the incident of January 6^th in the United States with the storming of the U.S. Capitol Building indicates such an extraordinary circumstance. Is a return to Jim Crow such a circumstance? In Hamilton’s opinion, elections are left to “local administrations … in the ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail ….” The United States has recently experienced uprisings and protests by persons of all races, colors, creeds, nationalities, religions and sexual orientations. Is there a need for election laws that would guarantee equality of representation with uniform voter qualifications throughout the Union?

The balance of power between the states and federal government need not be wholly undone by a constitutional amendment. Rather, we should place first the principle of the preservation of fair, equitable, just and honest government. Discretionary power over elections may be abused wherever it resides. And, historically, it has been abused at both the state and federal levels. Once, rivalry and ambition among the states justified the power of state election law. Now, national and international commerce support national standards of elections and the inclusion of all eligible voters in the election process.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

A New Melting Pot

The present dissension in our ever so diverse society should not allow individual affiliations of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, and or sexual orientation, etc., transcend our fidelity to citizenship and equality under the rule of law. Individuals will always possess unique group identities that separate them one from another. But as stated in The Melting Pot, written by playwright Israel Zangwill and first performed to rave reviews by President Theodore Roosevelt in Washington, D.C. in 1908, individuals can amalgamate into a melting pot of citizens who maintain and express their pluralistic selves. Yet, each citizen would respect the culture of all under one government.

Our modern democracy should provide that all cultures are neither preempted by government nor society so long as respectful of democracy. The continuum of political affiliations from left to right should also freely express their opinions in this manner. Civil discussion and debate are the requirements of a democratic society.

Neither we nor our leaders should allow our pluralistic identities determine our decisions and opinions. Rather, in a democratic society we participate in our political community and do so in a way that places the principles governing our republic above all else. The doctrines incumbent within our group identities must defer to these founding principles.

Citizen participation should be facilitated by reasonable means. Many do not participate for want of knowledge. They do not know how a vote may be cast. Similarly, private and public leadership should consider public opinion regarding life’s issues and concerns. Civil and respectful public expression should be encouraged and not ignored. Most importantly, it must be included in private and governmental decision making.

Within the melting pot of the twenty-first century, we seek a social contract of a just society under our democratic government by imagining that we, ourselves, do not know our respective future condition, our position in society, or our own self-interest. We then seek laws and governing institutions that safeguard the position of the least well-off in society as that becomes our point of self-interest. For, social unrest occurs when our social contract is disregarded, and there appears to be no other means of effective popular expression.

The melting pot requires that public and private leaders guide citizens in their ability to place citizenship above personal identities. Policies and decisions should reflect the myriad of identities in society.

Judicial Determination of City Council Suspensions is a Good Thing

City of Cincinnati Council Member Betsy Sundermann has offered an amendment to the City Charter which would permit the Cincinnati City Council to sanction council members for alleged criminal activity. The proposed amendment is a comprehensive and extensive exercise of Home Rule. The amendment contends that the current disciplinary procedure is lengthy and complex, and that the proposed Charter amendment will provide an efficient and expedient method for removing council members. However, the proposed amendment overlooks several fundamental democratic principles.

The Charter amendment would eliminate the current right of voters to sue a council member for removal from office when the council member may have received illegal compensation for official duties, been interested in the profits of a city contract, have acted in a capacity in addition to being a council member with respect to work of the city, or been guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance in office. The proposed Charter amendment replaces this procedure with one that includes several potential sources of political impropriety.

The amendment permits City Council to suspend one of its own members under a state or federal indictment or charge of a crime of moral turpitude by vote of Council. A council member facing suspension is subject to the unfettered discretion of City Council, for the proposed procedure does not offer a standard governing Council’s suspension power other than the alleged misconduct of the council member.

Rather, the amendment permits a suspension to be determined by a mere majority vote of Council as if it were any other ordinary legislative act of the representative body. Matters such as suspension from office should be subject to a standard striving toward nonpartisanship. Since suspensions are not mandatory or automatic, the disciplinary procedure should seek to prevent the possibility that a suspension may be based upon reasons other than the alleged misconduct. By way of example, in the instance of the United States Congress, each House may expel a member only upon a two-thirds vote. Similarly, the Senate may convict an executive or judicial official on trial in the impeachment process only upon a two-thirds vote. Council must even itself admit that important, extraordinary and extreme acts such as the Charter amendment by emergency ordinance being used to initiate this disciplinary reform may only be approved upon a two-thirds vote of Council. Even the present authority given to municipalities by Ohio Revised Code Section 731.45 to expel one of its own members for disorderly conduct requires a two-thirds vote. Yet, Council asks for the power to oust one of its own by only a majority vote.

The two-thirds, supermajority standard for important measures was chosen historically for two reasons. First, measures which transcend and supplant the will of the people, such as suspension of an elected official, should require more than an ordinary exercise of the power of the representatives. And, second, a supermajority places acts initiated for mere political objectives beyond the reach of collaborative faction. Suspension should not be a political matter.

In addition to the probate court removal power the Charter amendment seeks to replace, the primary disciplinary method under Ohio law is also judicial. It provides that suspension from office before a council member is proven guilty undermines our democracy unless done by the highest court in the state with the assistance of a lower court in filling any vacancy. This is closer to an innocent until proven guilty standard.

This primary disciplinary procedure only permits a council member’s suspension from office if the council member is charged with a felony under state or federal law and the alleged crime relates to performance of the council member’s official duties or is adverse to the rights and interests of the public at large. It also requires participation by two branches of Ohio government, the Attorney General or the Council’s county prosecuting attorney in the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court in the Judicial.

Under this method, the Attorney General or Council’s county prosecutor determines whether the alleged felonious conduct relates to the council member’s official duties or is otherwise adverse to the public. If, so the Attorney General or prosecutor informs the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who then convenes a special commission of three retired justices or judges, one of the same political party as the council member in question. The special commission then makes a preliminary determination as to whether the council member’s conduct adversely affected the member’s office or the rights and interests of the public, and, consequently, whether the official should be suspended from office.

If the special commission finds that the allegedly illegal conduct does not pose a threat to the member’s office or the public interest, the council member is not suspended from office. If, instead, the special commission reaches a preliminary finding that the council member’s conduct does adversely affect the office or the public rights and interests and that the council member should be suspended from office, the council member is given an opportunity to appear before the special commission and contest the preliminary determination of suspension. The special commission makes a final determination after the meeting and the council member is suspended immediately if the special commission finds that the council member’s conduct was adverse to the office or the public’s rights or interests. The final determination of suspension by the special commission has the same force and effect as a court judgment. The council member may appeal the special commission’s finding to the Supreme Court. The official remains suspended until there is a reversal by the Supreme Court or the council member is found not guilty of the allegedly illegal conduct.

Judicial determination of suspension of a legislative official possesses the traditional “checks and balances” of dividing government to avoid abusive concentrations of power and to mitigate partisan exploitation. It seems unwise to replace a judicial determination of suspension with a procedure that could result in a partisan vote of the legislature within which the member in question sits.

One would hope that one motivation for the proposed Home Rule amendment is not to lessen the burden on the judicial docket, generally, and with respect to suspension cases, specifically. We need a preventative solution to the problem of corruption in government, greater care in local government, not merely a transfer of power for remedying corruption.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

Judicial Determination of City Council Suspensions is a Good Thing

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

Investment is Participation

As residents of a democratic republic, we self-govern and participate in ways other than merely through the ballot box. Participation in our market economy is required to safeguard the freedoms and liberties of a just democracy. Consequnelty, I am sharing a comment I submitted today to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding investments of a type with which we are all familiar.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

April 26, 2020

Sent Via Email to:rule-comments@sec.gov

Vanessa A. Countryman

Office of the Secretary

Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street NE

Washington, DC 20549-1090

Re: File No. S7-04-20

Dear Secretary,

I write with interest in Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) Release Nos. IC-33809; File No. S7-04-20, dated March 2, 2020 (the “Release”) concerning the Request for Comments on Fund Names (the “Request for Comments”) and the discussion therein of the possible amendment of the Commission’s regulation of names of registered investment companies and business development companies (hereinafter referred to as “Funds”), specifically 17 C.F.R. §270.35d-1, promulgated under section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-34(d)) (hereinafter referred to as “Rule 35d-1” or the “Name Rule”). The essential purpose and rationale for the Name Rule, as stated in the Commission’s release announcing its adoption dated January 17, 2001, remain unchanged. (Release No. IC-24828; File No. S7-11-97) (66 Fed. Reg. 8509-8519)(as corrected at 66 Fed. Reg.14828-29) (the “Adopting Release”). Consequently, I recommend that there is no need for significant amendment or revision. Rule 35d-1 continues to meet the Commission’s regulatory objectives in the main.

Since the Commission’s creation almost a century ago during the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Commission has maintained a two-fold purpose: serving a perceived need for investor protection and facilitating our nation’s commerce through guidance of public and private companies. The Name Rule is a recent regulation that achieves both of these objectives. As a primary example, the United States has long recovered from the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression and the existence of unregulated markets that inspired the Commission’s creation. Both those selling securities and those investing in securities have learned to not misuse or misread, respectively, terms including the name United States, U.S. Treasury, etc., in the description of financial instruments. Thus, the proscription against doing so contained in §270.35d-1(a)(1) has long achieved its didactic purpose and it should remain as drafted.

The Commission has noted a concern regarding the Name Rule’s current requirement that any Fund whose name suggests that it “focuses its investments in a particular type of investment or investments” or in a particular industry or type of industries must adopt a policy to invest at least 80% of the value of its assets in the particular type of investment or type of industry suggested by its name “under normal circumstances.” 17 C.F.R. §270.35d-1(a)(2). If fund management decides to vary from the investment policy suggested by the fund name it must provide its shareholders with at least 60 days advance notice of a change in the policy governing its investments. 17 C.F.R. §270.35d-1(a)(2).[1] If the Fund does not comply with these requirements, the name of the Fund is considered to be “a materially deceptive and misleading name.” 17 C.F.R. §270.35d-1(a).

The Adopting Release of the Name Rule sets forth the Commission’s position as to the proper interpretation of the “80% requirement.” As stated at 66 Fed. Reg. 8516:

“Only those investment companies that have names suggesting a particular investment emphasis are required to comply with the rule. In general, to comply with the rule, an investment company with a name that suggests that the company focuses on a particular type of investment will either have to adopt a fundamental policy to invest at least 80% of its assets in the type of investment suggested by its name or adopt a policy of notifying its shareholders at least 60 days prior to any change in its 80% investment policy. The 80% investment requirement will allow an investment company to maintain up to 20% of its assets in other investments. An investment company seeking maximum flexibility with respect to its investments will be free to use a name that does not connote a particular investment emphasis.”

In the absence of comment by Funds that the 80% requirement proves too burdensome a restriction since its adoption in 2001, this percentage should be maintained. The public as well as the ordinary investor perceives in the ordinary course that the stated purpose of Rule 35d-1, that of providing the public with an accurate understanding of fund policies and objectives, requires a significant commitment to the investment objective suggested by the Fund name. The 80% requirement is one readily understood by investors and lessening it is not indicated. Investors are expected and do alter investment allocations under the theory of the 80% requirement. The leeway provided funds to depart from the 80% requirement when incurring other than ordinary market conditions is an exceedingly permissive exception to the 80% requirement, for it defers to the discretion of Fund management as governed by fiduciary duty subject to SEC review on a case-by-case basis. Lastly, while the 60 day notice to shareholders requirement places the burden upon the ordinary investor to alter investments upon a change in Fund investment policy, a longer period would undermine the purpose of providing some profitable market flexibility to Funds.

Market conditions have changed in both the increased growth and diversity of potential investments. Consequently, emerging markets and their attendant risks are numerous. There is an even greater need for the 80% requirement. It provides Commission guidance in defining the information to be provided investors as well as apprising Funds of potential liability. By maintaining the 80% requirement, the Commission discourages abstract and vague Fund names through requiring acknowledgement of a need for specificity in the marketplace. For, an investor should know and expect to be informed as strictly as possible as to the nature of the Fund’s investments and the 80% requirement achieves this end.

As the Commission suggested in the Request for Comments, market conditions pose issues of whether regulation is needed for Funds devoted to “qualitative” policy objectives, such as investments guided by environmental, social and or governmental concerns. 85 Fed. Reg. at 13224. Such lack of regulation may lead to investor confusion and the avoidance of investment. To ease investment, compliance and enforcement, the Commission could require that a Fund engaged in such qualitative objectives comply with a standard similar to that currently governing Funds whose investments are tied to certain countries or geographic areas. 17 C.F.R. §270.35d-1(a)(3). In doing so, the Commission could require that the Fund enumerate a qualitative criterion or set of criteria that are set forth in the governing documents of the entities in which it invests. The criteria would reflect the Fund’s qualitative objective or objectives and aptly be reflected in the Fund’s name. Restricting a Fund to one qualitative factor or criterion in its name might unduly restrict market activity and competition and result in a multiplicity of Funds in order to achieve several qualitative objectives. Requiring disclosure of the criteria would avoid the vagueness and abstraction of the “ESG” (environment, social or government) termed Funds.

Regulation of Funds whose name connotes global or international investments is probably not necessary. For, the ordinary investor would understand the wording used in these types of Funds. If greater specificity is needed by investors, market competition would result in more narrowly designed Funds. Requiring greater specificity in a Fund name and disclosure materials as to the type of international investments would, however, shift the primary burden of review from the investor to the Fund.

Similarly, in governing derivatives, Rule 35d-1 ably meets the Commission’s primary concern of disclosure of risk to the investor. Use of the asset-based test of market value rather than notational value to determine whether a Fund is in compliance with the 80% requirement instructs the investor without further inquiry and also guides the Fund in compliance. Marker valuation better indicates price sensitivity.

In conclusion, investors properly rely fundamentally upon Fund management and its due diligence, judgment and maintenance of fiduciary duties. The Commission, and Rule 35d-1 specifically, ably guide Funds and investors in market participation. In reviewing the Name Rule, the Commission must decide how much diligence should be borne by the ordinary investor.

I thank you greatly for the opportunity to comment before you. And, if additional information might be of assistance, I may be contacted as indicated above.

Sincerely,

Lori G. Nuckolls

[1] If the Fund is a tax-exempt fund, such a policy is deemed a “fundamental policy” and may not be changed without a vote of fund shareholders. 17 C.F.R. §270.35d-1(a)(4).

The Hegelian Dialectic Of Capitalism And Socialism In The American Bureaucracy

Socialism may be impossible yet it is unavoidable and must occur in cycles of reform with Capitalism. In the Hegelian theory of dialectical materialism of existence, critique and synthesis in remedy and solution, Capitalism is destroyed in part periodically by Socialist reform and then reborn again. In the United States, Capitalism is structurally restrained by bureaucratic reforms based upon theories of the public interest, nationalism and the commonweal, all theories of Socialist empathy.

The U.S. Constitution creates three branches of government: the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The President, as a modern Executive, is empowered with an enormous regulatory bureaucracy which is overseen in a manner of checks and balances by the other two branches. This modern bureaucratic state has placed upon the private sector a primary motive of being that departs from the for-profit motive of Capitalism and imposes that of ensuring legal compliance. In a complex era of high technology and big industry, this Socialist leaning is unavoidable if Capitalism is to survive. And, such regulation, though democratic and Capitalistic in spirit and theory, is Socialist in result.

This dualism, the points along a continuum of Capitalism and Socialism, in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, is humankind’s striving toward the absolute freedom of the species in actualization of an unknown Idea, the consummation of evolution. Regardless of one’s belief in the source or definition of the Idea, humans evolve incrementally, improving life in their community. The various elements of the community each evolve along the Hegelian dialectic from existence to critique to synthetic improvement. The many elements include: religion, science, philosophy, art, literature and education. An additional element is the economic Capitalist-Socialist continuum which evolves in dialectical form and is expressed in the governing structure of the community.

Through rational, reasoned reform of its Capitalist governing structure overtime, America has achieved its current bureaucratic state. This bureaucratic state is currently in a period of contraction, with the undoing of some Socialist theories and returning to earlier thoughts of Capitalism. Much of the current trend toward a rebirth of Capitalism is a result of new technology and the creativity it has inspired in the area of commerce. Entrepreneurs are emerging in all business sectors. Americans who enjoy new goods and services and a sense of patriotism economic creativity engenders ask for reforms in government to facilitate further business development.

The current expression in America of this phenomenon, of a demand for government and economic creativity, is not a full destructive critique of Socialist expressions in the American government and economy. Rather, it is an expression of the Janus dualism in human nature. As history indicates, humans are innately inquisitive and acquisitively self-interested. Humans as a species are also affectionate and emphatic. From the beginning of Colonial America until the current presidency, America has evolved in cycles of “boom and bust,” high surges in Capitalist creativity and profit absent imposing regulation to despairs of economic failure and the lessening burden of governmental business safe harbors and social safety nets. This is an example of the philosophical construct of dialectical materialism.

In example, the legislature acts in response to changes in popular will with developments in human history. Citizens ask for a repeal of burdensome laws in times of business prosperity and, in turn, for social measures in times of hardship. Unlike legislators, judges are bound by codes of ethics to abide the rule of law first and foremost as it embodies theories of democracy, fairness and justice. These theories should be immutable regardless of the nature of economic times, regardless of boom or bust. So, to what do we attribute judicial repeal of time honored legal precedent, especially when these changes in the law coincidentally parallel new economic events and changes in popular will?

Judges exercise independent judgment absent partisanship. Yet, in the spirit of Ludwig von Mises and great thinkers from time immemorial, judges acknowledge the essential qualities of human nature – self-interest, greed, empathy and affection. So, too, judicial opinions reflect changes in history and socio-economic developments over time which avail themselves of the Hegelian dialectic as expressed in Capitalist and Socialist theory. An essential question exists as to whether the judiciary must respond to the import of the human creativity these qualities produce and the effect of human creativity upon the community the judiciary governs?

The American public should discuss the nature of governmental reform as expressed by changes in rights and privileges incumbent within the rule of law. The primary focus is the Hegelian dialectic of the Capitalist-Socialist continuum.

Colonial America expressed the dialectical continuum with the beginning point of the existence of the individual rights possessed by Native Americans. The discoverers of the New World were encouraged by developments in the means of maritime travel to conquer the Native Americans and, in Capitalist fashion, usurp their property in a theory of survival of the fittest. Yet, the Colonials stepped away from their own usurper, the English monarchy, through many acts and demands of social welfare, namely the survival of humans as individuals, possessing equal rights of individual self-governance and self-determination in a communal environment. The history of Colonial America is one of synthesis for England imposed tariffs as a large, usurpations government providing for English citizens. Yet, the Colonial and Early Americans, themselves, engaged in a Capitalist plantation economy with Socialist theories of paternalism in the maintenance of the institution of slavery and indentured servitude. Native Americans, even today, benefit from theories of Socialism.

The American Civil War began a critique of the Capitalism of the slave economy. It began with individuals forming the Underground Railroad and the act by predominately Northern slaveholders of permitting slaves to purchase their freedom through learning gainful labor or acts of unrestricted emancipation. The Socialist critique of the then existing Capitalist American economy consummated with the act by President Lincoln of emancipation.

In response, to newfound competition of Americans of African descent, the judicial opinion of Plessey v. Ferguson was issued imposing business restraints upon Black Americans. This, too, is a dualist, synthetic critique expressing Capitalist and Socialist theories. For, it provided a Socialist business subsidy to White Americans thereby encouraging competition at the expense of Black Americans. The Socialist correction was Brown v. Board of Education. Intervening was extensive public reform in the creation of the American Bureaucratic State in the form of the New Deal.

America continues the challenge of the bureaucratic state in the modern era. Much regulation is currently challenged to permit new forms of industry. The Hegelian dialectic provides material synthesis of contradiction and paradox to form new laws from new customs and new legal developments in the private sector of contract law and business formation.

The remedies proposed for the laws currently governing bureaucracies in America are equally along extreme points in a continuum. Some purveyors of conservative legal thought seek a return to theories of non-delegation which would extensively negate the power of Congress to delegate “legislative” power in the form of rulemaking to bureaucratic agencies. More liberal points of view on the continuum would support agencies by expressing great deference to their exercise of rulemaking and adjudicative powers owing to their expertise in highly specific subjects requiring centuries of experience.

In America, we rely upon the judiciary to honor a truly just midpoint along the Hegelian dialectic of Capitalist and Socialist reform. With the U.S. Constitution in place, we will never return to an economy that is too Capitalist or evolve into one that is too Socialist.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

Are We Changing The Law Governing The Presidency?

Must we acknowledge that previous presidents over the course of American history abided practices, strategies and customs similar to those of Presidents in the modern era? And, similarly, if these principles and practices are centuries old, must we acknowledge that we are imposing a revision of the legal standards governing the presidency if we sanction modern presidents for ages old conduct?

One example of the foregoing would be the foreign policy of President John Tyler, the 10th president from 1841 until 1845. President Tyler confronted the issue of possession by the United States of only part of the Northern American continent and not the Pacific Northwest which was occupied by Britain and Mexico. President Tyler sought these territories, Oregon from Britain and California from Mexico.

Initially, President Tyler proposed a tripartite treaty wherein America would forego 2 million dollars of its claims against Mexico in exchange for California, north of the thirty-second parallel. Britain would be asked to support these terms in exchange for a favorable determination of the Oregon boundary without warfare, one at the Columbia River. Yet, this treaty proposal was not successful. Mexico sought to retain California, and British officials did not wish to unduly pressure Mexico to accept America’s terms.

President Tyler still wished to resolve the issue of ownership of the Northern American continent without warfare. He proposed a tripartite commercial treaty involving the lowering of tariffs. President Tyler sent a private citizen, Duff Green, at government expense to Britain. He informed the American Ambassador to Britain, Edward Everett, that it would be Green’s role to be of substantial service in negotiations.

Even earlier, President Tyler and his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, contracted with a private entrepreneur, Alfred Benson, to transport Americans seeking residence in Oregon. They were transported with government funds.

In sum, President Tyler engaged in significant acts of foreign relations without Congressional approval or oversight. If we in the 21^st century, rather than those of Tyler’s 19^th century, are to assert that these types of entreaties into formal resolution of policy issues and disputes are improper, we should have an understanding that we are imposing a new legal standard upon existing custom.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls