Philosophy, Law and Politics

Greenspace and Culture for All!

The Cincinnati park of Burnet Woods is a wonderful asset of the Cincinnati community, and has been so since first begun in 1872. And, our community is obligated to both maintain and transition this park into a modern greenspace. Cincinnatians and learned science professionals, together, should discuss and decide the proper changes to Burnet Woods and Cincinnati’s greenspaces, generally. The current proposal for two community center buildings in Burnet Woods brings to popular discussion an issue not yet mentioned that is less related to concerns of environmental preservation. Specifically, the proposal to place a building within Burnet Woods that would essentially serve the current purposes of the Clifton Cultural Arts Center asks questions about equal planning for our various neighborhoods in Cincinnati.

Currently, the Clifton center provides cultural events and educational resources to those beyond the neighborhood of Clifton. Many young and old within Cincinnati would like to continue to rely upon the center. And, its location in Burnet Woods would have to be generally accessible by car and school bus. For, it is unlikely that it would be as currently within reach of those visiting by foot from nearby. But, more importantly, the center would place on public land a resource generally needed, yet unavailable, in most neighborhoods. The Clifton center arose from the needs and requests of one Cincinnati neighborhood. And, it has ably done so. Yet, a similar cultural resource has been long discussed and requested by many neighborhoods similarly in need, including the neighborhood of Ohio Representative Alicia Reece, namely Bond Hill.

Most neighborhoods would not be provided for by the arts center proposed for Burnet Woods. Before the Burnet Woods center is approved, we have an obligation to discuss providing access to cultural arts equally within the city. It is unlikely and unwise that each neighborhood community requesting such a center could request a similar grant of land to do so by the Cincinnati Park Board. The Burnet Woods proposal is not properly precedent, or ratio decidendi.

The discussion of providing beyond the neighborhood recreation centers is a difficult one, and neighborhoods such as Bond Hill have long puzzled the question of transitioning an aged commercial business district for modern use. A small cultural center was proposed for an area near the intersection of Reading Road and California Avenue. It would have been similar to the current centers in Kennedy Heights and Pleasant Ridge. Perhaps it, alone, would not have completely sufficed. Yet when does capitalism not permit trial and error of not-for-profit ventures as for our for-profit, start-up entrepreneurial ones. Essentially, the Burnet Woods center only initiates review and discussion obligatorily within the purview of our discussion of fair and equal neighborhood planning.

For our neighborhoods stymied as to a beginning, even a small urban gardening space, such as one upon a space near the proposed cultural center in Bond Hill, would begin discussion with a venture not requiring a permanent decision or commitment, and which, even if only short term, would ameliorate an available space.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Philosophy, Law and Politics

To Legalize, Or, Not To Legalize?

In discussing the current debate of whether the use and sale of marijuana should be generally allowed in each of the 50 States, and no longer be deemed a criminal activity, requires that thought be given to American history and traditional theories of the law. And, perhaps our debate should focus on the history of Prohibition, last century.

Currently proposed legislation before the U.S. Congress asks if the Federal government may, or should, dictate that the use of marijuana is legal conduct for every citizen in every state. Or, should the Federal Government respect the aged-old American doctrine of States Rights and the prudent theory of experimentation within and among jurisdictions, whether they be the Federal judicial Appellate Circuits, the States themselves, or the various political subdivisions therewithin?

As citizens, we must ask in what manner marijuana differs from the time honored American custom of enjoying fermented and distilled spirits – alcohol. If marijuana is properly legal in the United States, regardless of locale, for social, and not only medical, purposes, what is the scientific rationale for permitting it being criminalized in any jurisdiction within the country? If legal in any State and deemed safe by our scientific community, is there a valid legal rationale for treating the use of marijuana differently from the current regulation of our use of alcohol?

Traditional grassroots, self-governance of communities in America is the foundation of our democracy, our representative republic. Governing jurisdictions, as small as towns and villages, may dictate legal policy as to the sale and use of alcohol within their jurisdictions. Yet, they may not proscribe the use of alcohol. This has only been done and repealed by a revision of the U.S. Constitution. Marijuana, like alcohol, should properly be regulated below the Federal level by State and Local Governments only as they regulate commerce within their boundaries. Like alcohol, marijuana requires more regulation than English muffins and wheat bread. Such regulation, though, results from theories of corporate and business structure, and the proper purposes of land use management – zoning restrictions.

If legal in one State, marijuana should be legal in all. And, the existence of the 50 States, and our various political subdivisions and territories, permits American capitalism to experiment. Various business forms may evolve from the art of the “dry county,” the State owned and or regulated, stand alone “brick and mortar” business concern, or the State regulated, corner shop in the interstate or international grocery store.

And, there cannot be an argument for not fully expunging the criminal records of conviction and time served for offenders penalized for personal expression before their governing officials “saw the light.” It goes without saying, then, that, too, all criminal defendants currently “serving time” for marijuana only offenses should be released through existing transitional, reentry programs. Not doing so would be merely a creative theory of law ex post facto.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Philosophy, Law and Politics

Is the Mandatory Reporting of Convictions to Relevant Agencies Necessary for Fairness and Justice in Our Courts?

Adequate diligence and complete information are necessary for fair and sound decisions by judges, in both civil and criminal matters. Might States benefit from an enhanced requirement that criminal convictions of licensed professionals, for both lesser and more severe offenses, be reported to the State agency governing the defendant’s profession?

A measure before the New York State Legislature, Assembly (A11057-A) and Senate (S8909-A), would amend the New York education law to require reporting to the governing New York State Education Department the criminal convictions and determinations of professional misconduct of persons licensed by the Education Department. The District Attorney for each county within the State of New York would be required to report each conviction of a licensee to the Professional Conduct Officer of the Education Department. The licensee is similarly bound by an obligation of self-reporting. The licensee must self-report criminal convictions to the Education Department. The licensee is also required to report determinations of professional misconduct to the Education Department, regardless of jurisdiction.

A statutory system of fair reporting and due information provides those governed, such as those licensed by the New York Education Department, with both an incentive for proper professional conduct and a deterrence of nonprofessional conduct, before any ill deed is done. Professional codes provide learning within one’s professional disciple throughout one’s career, long after one’s formal academic training. And, a system of fair reporting insures that employers and the courts make fair, adequate and just determinations.

In founding the first American newspaper, Publick Occurrences, first sold in Boston on September 25, 1960, Benjamin Harris stated in his prospectus:

“That something may be done toward the Curing, or at least the Charming of that Spirit of Lying, which prevails amongst us, wherefore nothing shall be entered, but what we have reason to believe is true, repairing to the best fountains for our Information. And when there appears any material mistake in anything that is collected, it shall be corrected in the next. Moreover, the Publisher of these Occurrences is willing to engage, that whereas, there are many False Reports, maliciously made, and spread among us, if any well-minded person will be at the pains to trace any such false Report, so far as to find out and Convict the First Raiser of it, he will in this Paper (unless just Advice be given to the contrary) expose the Name of such Person, as A malicious Raiser of a false Report. It is suppos’d that none will dislike this Proposal, but such as intend to be guilty of so villainous a Crime.”

Neither the public nor the courts benefit from acting upon an absence of information. And, no one subject to a mandatory reporting requirement benefits if deprived of the rehabilitative purpose of ostensibly putative measures by inadequate information.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

Is a Failure to Prosecute Utterances of “Hate Speech” and “Fighting Words” a Violation of Due Process by Ohio County Prosecutors in Not Protecting the Victim’s Constitutional Rights of Liberty, Privacy and Personhood?

Under Ohio law, Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 regulates “hate speech” or “fighting words.” This statute expressly prescribes “offensively coarse utterance [and] gesture[,]” and “insulting [or] taunting [conduct] … likely to provoke a violent response.” § 2917.11(A)(2), (3). This law lies within criminal provisions of the Ohio Revised Code denominated “Disorderly Conduct,” as one of many “Offenses Against the Public Peace” of Chapter 2917. Has any duly elected Ohio County Prosecutor recently invoked this provision?

How does the community resident evaluate whether the absence of arrest and prosecution in his or her Ohio County is a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion in regulating conduct under Ohio law? In what other ways are the constitutionally protected, basic and fundamental rights of Ohio citizens and residents to privacy and personhood, as incumbent within our essential rights of liberty and freedom, protected from independent, idiosyncratic, and isolated acts of speech contrary to personal integrity?

Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 should be used by Ohio County Prosecutors to guide popular conduct, as a didactic tool. Section 2917.11 deters visceral, unkind speech directed, especially, to a person the potential perpetrator does not even know. And, importantly, this law looks to proscribe harmful words spoken when no logical rationale exists for devolving into such conduct when long historically permitted forms of expression and advocacy exist.

If traditional forms of expression, speech and participatory politics are possible, conduct subject to prosecution under Ohio Revised Code § 2917.17 only evokes either fear harmful to one’s sense of personhood or, more difficultly, fear expressed in the form of a harmful or violent response from the victim of the unkind speech. Do we instead prosecute the victim for engaging in an improper response to unprovoked hate speech and let the utterer of fighting words go free? Why is the fearful, dependent spouse convicted of homicide for shooting a long abusive, domineering spouse while asleep and unlikely to rise up in confrontation? When is self-defense illegal?

Is an Ohio County Prosecutor’s failure to prosecute hate speech and fighting words an unconstitutional disregard for the right of every individual to liberty, privacy and personal integrity, all long respected by the U.S. Supreme Court? Should the Ohio County Prosecutor, as a state actor, be subject to civil action, under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, for such a failure to prosecute? The right to Due Process includes one’s liberty interests, and the duty of the Ohio County Prosecutor to protect the liberty interests of Ohio citizens and residents subject to personally intrusive fighting words and hate speech by prosecuting those engaging in hateful speech. Does Section 1983 include a substantive due process right to challenge in Federal Court an Ohio County Prosecutor for the absence of prosecution of fighting words perpetrators under Ohio law?

The consequences arising from an Ohio County Prosecutor’s decision to not prosecute acts criminal under Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 are self-defining and derive inherently from the Anglo-American Common Law giving rise to the U.S. Constitution. A want of review, regulation and criminalization results in a perpetuation and acculturation of illegal intent and conduct within our country. American criminal law has many purposes, including, deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution and retribution. Laws exist on the “statute books” for a reason. These are the reasons for Ohio Revised Code § 2917.11 .

How do we begin? How does the first individual abused as to self and personhood come forward in Federal Court and ask why his or her Ohio County Prosecutor did not seek redress on his or her behalf under expressly worded Ohio Law? Should such prosecution on the individual’s behalf be so permissive, and not a mandatory obligation of the duly ethical Ohio County Prosecutor under the professional rules and judicial decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court?

Life in our American Republic requires free speech and a sense of participation without fear and without improper inhibition. Justice and fairness in our democracy require that Ohio County Prosecutors act zealously, with best efforts and with a sense of being conservative to the utmost. Non action and a failure to prosecute potential perpetrators under enacted legislation is not conservative, it is the opposite. Prosecutorial discretion is both permissive and mandatory. Where do our State and Federal Courts draw the line?

In a democracy, free speech is a property right. It is not to only be accorded governmental protection as a permissive privilege. In America, a citizen or resident should not feel as if he or she must ask permission of an equal to speak or live, for fear of becoming a victim of hostile words. He or she should freely speak. If the equal is inhibiting in a manner contrary to § 2917.11, the Ohio County Prosecutor should act.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls

In Pursuit of Both Common Good and Public Interest, Governmental Entities Should be Required to Promote Self-Governance (Written testimony before the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review of the Ohio General Assembly.)

The text below is of a letter submitted yesterday, Christmas Day, in comment testimony before the Ohio General Assembly Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review. It concerns proposed rule making by the Attorney General for the State of Ohio in implementation of federal funding to provide support services to victims of sexual abuse. It is to be considered during the Committee’s next regularly scheduled meeting, tentatively scheduled for January 8, 2018.

Lori Gayle Nuckolls, Esq.

December 25, 2017

Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review
The Ohio General Assembly
Vern Riffe Center
77 South High Street
Concourse Level
Columbus, Ohio 43215

Sent Via Email to: jcarr1@jcarr.state.oh.us

Re: Attorney General Proposed Rules 109:7-1-05 (disbursements) and 109:7-1-06 (definitions)

Dear Members of the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review,

I write with interest in the proposed addition to the Ohio Administrative Code of new rules 109:7-1-05 and 109:7-1-06 by the Attorney General regarding the implementation of funding provisions for rape crisis programs under the auspices of the federal centers for disease prevention and control and denominated in the Ohio Revised Code as the “Rape crisis program trust fund.” Ohio Revised Code § 109.921. This program, as enacted, envisions comprehensive services for victims of sexual trauma.

The Ohio Revised Code mandates the Attorney General to provide funding to a “Rape crisis program,” which, as most broadly defined by statute, includes a “nonprofit [nongovernmental] entity that provides a full continuum of services to victims of sexual assault, including hotlines, victim advocacy, and support services from the onset of the need for services through the completion of healing ….” § 109.921(A)(1)(c) (emphasis added). And, the Ohio Revised Code states that “[a] rape crisis program that receives funding … shall use the money received … for the following purposes [among others]:” “(2) … hotlines, victim advocacy, or support services.” O.R.C. § 109.921(D) (emphasis added). However, in contradiction to the foregoing express grant of statutory authority for the funding of “victim advocacy,” the new rule 109-7-05 proposed by the Attorney General expressly prohibits the use of funds for “Lobbying activities.” Proposed Rule 109-7-05(F)(1).

It does not seem that the Attorney General has included a definition of “Lobbying” in the proposed new rules. See, Proposed Rule 109:7-1-06 (definitions governing the trust fund). Nor does a definition of either “advocacy” or “lobbying” seem to appear in any other source of authority that would be applicable to this funding provision, apart and distinct from those generally previously existing under Ohio law. See, O.A.C. § 109:7-01-03 (definitions governing trust fund) and O.A.C. § 109:7-1-04 (procedures for submitting funding requests). See also, O.R.C. §101.70(E) (to “Actively advocate” deemed “Legislative lobbying.”); O.R.C. § 121.60(I) (“[C]ontacts made to promote, oppose, or otherwise influence … an executive agency decision” deemed “lobbying activity.”); and O.R.C. § 3517.20(A)(1), (2), & (3) (defining “Political communications” as those statements “for or against” or “advertising”).

The funding by the Attorney General should encourage productive informal discussions on diverse topics. The proposed funding would, and is needed to, do so. However, the prohibition on lobbying efforts in the proposed rule should be clarified for those entities to be funded. Discussion by program participants should relate to important, current issues in the community, especially as to those seeking support for transitions in difficult times. Activities financed under this trust fund would be an act of the governmental or nonprofit entity, and would not constitute a use of the funds by individual persons in behest of personal expression on various topics. Thus, some revision is indicated for the avoidance of express contradiction of the proposed rules with the authorizing legislation, and even as to contradiction within the very proposed rules, as to the use by the Attorney General of both “advocacy” and “lobbying.”

I offer that the Attorney General should modify the proposed rules to not expressly reach issues of “lobbying,” which under Ohio law includes advocacy. Rather, the Attorney General should only expect funding recipients to remain in compliance with the general laws governing lobbying and political influence. Consequently, funded centers could guide program participants on an individual basis as to personal issues and only be reviewed if they as fund recipients assert interested positions. This would prohibit persuasive statements or presentations by the funded entities which would constitute lobbying under Ohio law, yet still permit funds to support conversation among participants. And, the written informational material and oral presentations of advocacy organizations unaffiliated with the fund recipients could be made available in the ordinary course to permit informed decision making by program participants.

I thank you greatly for considering my comments on this rule. And, I may certainly be contacted as indicated above.

Sincerely,

Lori G. Nuckolls